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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: July 6th, 2023

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  • Session was a good idea, but not implemented well

    All file attachments go to a central server I think in Canada

    They copied the signal protocol, and monero, to build their application but they removed perfect forward secrecy. Because it was hard to implement. This means of any session device ever gets compromised, somebody can look at the entire conversation from packets they captured on the wire

    I’m much more excited about simplex and briar









  • Okay, you’ve lost me. What is your core objective?

    Grapheneos aims to be the most secure phone out of the box. That means the least amount of risk surface out of the box. That means all the control to the user.

    To accomplish this mission, graphene OS uses Pixel phones. Because they give the most control.

    If you want to encourage other developers to make other phones, that’s great. I actually support that. I’m looking forward to postmark os becoming mature.

    For you to determine what vendors to trust, you have to have a good understanding of your personal risk model. What your threats are, and what you’re willing to trade to mitigate those threats. By default, out of the box, there is no trust for any vendor in gos.

    You as the user have a blank slate, a locked down phone, with minimal risk surface, and no preconceived notions. If you want to install the Google store, you can. If you want to use f Droid, you can. If you want to install apps directly from GitHub from developers that you trust you can. You have total control. That is what GOS gives you, total control




  • Ok, so your issue isn’t with GOS… this attack method exists all all known phones. IPC and specifically localhost connections are part of the general model of computers.

    For instance this is exactly how discord hijacks clicks on computers (windows, apple, and linux)

    There are mitigations for this specific type of attack, that you can implement on GOS (using a sockv5 enabled web browser, or blocking localhost connections) for instance.

    And the second post in your own link:

    By default our Vanadium browser disables the peer-to-peer aspect by only using server-based (proxied) connections.

    So GOS out of the box is already hardened against the meta attack…