- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
SMH @ activists using techno-fascist platforms for communications during an operation subject to state-actor level interference. I thought we recognised and acknowledged this problem 15-20 years ago already.
https://xcancel.com/CraigMurrayOrg/status/1965431513320927706
Doesn’t really matter, it’s the metadata that reveals your connections and locations. Surprisingly big amount of useful (but not necessarily correct or verifiable) intel can be gathered without eavesdropping into the actual conversations. People have been - on other occasions - targeted because they were connected to a person, who’s connections may have been suspicious to some state actors.
Huh? I was just curious, because it’s quite different if they used this as their main-channel. Using WhatsApp for that would be crazy.
My point was that even one phone with the WhatsApp app itself can mean compromised opsec. No matter if it’s used for operational communication or not, or whether or not the messages can be read by 3rd parties or not.