cross-posted from: https://programming.dev/post/36006277

Independent verification and publication by Socket Security.

Fixed: NordPass, ProtonPass, RoboForm, Dashlane, Keeper

Still vulnerable: Bitwarden, 1Password, iCloud Passwords, Enpass, LastPass, LogMeOnce

Key Points
  • A new clickjacking technique where a malicious script manipulates UI elements that browser extensions inject into the DOM by making them invisible using javascript.
  • In my research, I selected 11 password managers that are used as browser extensions and the result was that all were vulnerable to “DOM-based Extension Clickjacking”. Tens of millions of users could be at risk (~40 million active installations).
  • A single click anywhere on the attacker’s website could leak credit card details including security codes (6 out of 9 were vulnerable) or exfiltrate stored personal information (8 out of 10 vulnerable).
  • All password managers filled credentials not only to the “main” domain, but also to all subdomains. An attacker could easily find XSS or other vulnerabilities and steal the user’s stored credentials with a single click (10 out of 11), including TOTP (9 out of 11). In some scenarios, passkey authentication could also be exploited (8 out of 11).
  • All vulnerabilities were reported in April 2025 with a notice that public disclosure will be in August 2025. Some vendors have still not fixed described vulnerability: Bitwarden, 1Password, iCloud Passwords, Enpass, LastPass, LogMeOnce. Users of these password managers may still be at risk (~32.7 million active installations).
  • For Chromium-based browser users it is recommended to configure site access to “on click” in extension settings. This configuration allows users to manually control autofill functionality.
  • The described technique is general and I only tested it on 11 password managers. Other DOM-manipulating extensions are probably vulnerable (password managers, crypto wallets, notes etc.).
  • drspod@lemmy.ml
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    1 day ago

    It’s a clever attack but if I understand correctly it requires malicious script to be injected into a trusted webpage (ie. one that you normally log in to). This limits the utility of the attack, since any script injection vulnerability would already allow exfiltration of credentials that are entered manually when you log in to the site, password manager or not. The difference with this attack is that the attacker doesn’t have to wait for you to log in, they just trick the password manager into autofilling the credentials straight away.